For the best part of two decades, the investment firm ICU (Investment Capital Ukraine group) operated as a quiet but formidable force within Ukraine’s corridors of power, serving successive administrations and their most controversial figures. Rather than acting as a mere contractor providing financial services, the firm functioned as a trusted partner, deeply embedded in the opaque dealings of Viktor Yanukovych, his oligarch ally Viktor Medvedchuk, and later, President Petro Poroshenko. Their role was not peripheral; it was central. They are understood to have orchestrated secret negotiations and safeguarded the kind of compromising information that defines the shadow politics of the post-Soviet space.
Crucially, ICU’s influence extended into the very architecture of the state, successfully pushing for the appointment of their people to top-tier government positions. This included key regulators such as the National Bank of Ukraine, the Ministry of Energy, and the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission. This was never a simple transactional relationship; it was a symbiosis where financial acumen and political power were inextricably linked.
This history casts a stark light on the current, puzzling inaction of Ukrainian authorities. Given that Yanukovych, Medvedchuk, and Poroshenko have all, at various times, been subjected to National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) sanctions for their alleged roles in corruption and threats to national security, a glaring question emerges. Why are the officials at the NSDC, the Ministry of Justice, and the President’s Office, who are actively preparing sanctions packages against other entities, seemingly looking the other way when it comes to ICU? The firm’s key managers continue to operate freely, their assets untouched, their reputations in elite financial circles intact. It is a remarkable state of affairs for a group that was so intimately involved in the very schemes now deemed a threat to the state. This apparent invisibility before the law is arguably the most telling detail in the entire ICU story, suggesting that Ukraine’s most successful financial group might also be its most protected.
The contradictions become even sharper when examining ICU’s dealings with another sanctioned oligarch, Dmytro Firtash. A particularly illuminating episode occurred in 2015 and 2016, a period of intense political and media realignment following the Revolution of Dignity. At that time, the government was engaged in behind-the-scenes manoeuvring regarding the acquisition of the 112 Ukraine television channel. Today, 112 Ukraine is chiefly remembered as one of the principal mouthpieces for Viktor Medvedchuk’s pro-Kremlin propaganda, alongside NewsOne and ZiK. All three were finally shuttered by NSDC decree in February 2021. However, the common assumption that Medvedchuk was always the owner is incorrect. He did not acquire the channel until 2018. Before that, its ownership was a fiercely contested prize among other powerful players.
To understand the asset’s true value, one must go back to the era of President Yanukovych. His inner circle, seeking to counterbalance the influence of established media empires like 1+1, Inter, and ICTV, decided to build their own media platform. The project that would become 112 Ukraine began in 2011, when a number of regional broadcasting licences were consolidated by a company called TRK 112-TV LLC, nominally owned by businessman Andrii Pidshchypkov. By late 2012, these disparate frequencies were unified under a single, powerful brand: 112 Ukraine. It was not one channel but a group, a network of regional broadcasters rebroadcasting a single stream of content. The ownership structure was deliberately complex, a hallmark of Yanukovych-era business, involving Cypriot offshore companies and nominee directors. While Pidshchypkov was the public face, it was an open secret in political and journalistic circles that the ultimate beneficiary was Vitaliy Zakharchenko, the feared Interior Minister.
The channel’s format was innovative for Ukraine at the time: a continuous, 24-hour news cycle modelled directly on global giants like CNN, BBC World News, and Sky News. This approach resonated, and 112 Ukraine quickly became a staple on screens in government ministries and among the politically engaged public. But the 2014 Euromaidan revolution and the subsequent flight of Yanukovych and his allies threw the asset into a state of legal and political limbo. The newly installed President, Petro Poroshenko, a man who deeply understood the power of television to shape public opinion and political destiny—having seen his own Channel 5 play a pivotal role in both the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity – quickly set his sights on acquiring it. Publicly, Poroshenko presented himself as the nemesis of the Yanukovych regime, pursuing its officials for crimes including the shootings of Maidan protesters. Privately, and with considerable irony, he twice dispatched emissaries to the remnants of that very team to negotiate the handover of the channel.
And it was at this juncture that ICU, with its unparalleled access and expertise in managing such delicate transfers, was called upon to facilitate the deal, proving once again that in Ukrainian high finance and politics, the players may change, but the game and its facilitators remain the same.
Oleksandr Onyshchenko reveals his vision on the 112 TV channel acquisition
In 2016, the fugitive MP Oleksandr Onyshchenko disclosed several business dealings in which he had been involved during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko. In an effort to protect his gas production business, Onyshchenko claimed to have carried out specific instructions on behalf of the president. In particular, he alleged that he had bribed (at his own expense) other members of the Verkhovna Rada to vote in favour of bills that Poroshenko wanted to pass.
One of these instructions concerned the TV channel 112 Ukraine. According to an agreement, a draft of which was made public by Onyshchenko, the authorities promised to shield the channel from pressure, while the channel was obliged to portray the actions of the authorities in a positive light. However, the document also contained a clause stating that Onyshchenko would receive the priority right to purchase the channel. According to the fugitive MP, he conducted these negotiations on behalf of Poroshenko.
Ultimately, the deal fell through. According to Onyshchenko, “Poroshenko wanted the channel to be bought and sold for $17 million, while the owner of the channel, Andrii Pidshchypkov, asked for at least $25 million”.
The role of the investment company ICU and its shareholder Makar Paseniuk is of particular interest here. Paseniuk admitted that he had acted as an intermediary in the negotiations with Pidshchypkov. However, according to Paseniuk, Onyshchenko wanted to buy the channel for himself.
I would like to question this statement. At the time, Paseniuk was as close to Poroshenko as possible (in addition to the events described above; for example, the investment banker negotiated with Russian counterparts and was involved in transferring Poroshenko’s assets into a blind trust). Most likely, he was aware that he was helping the president acquire the 112 Ukraine channel.
In the same year, 2015, according to the then MP Serhiy Leshchenko, Poroshenko made another attempt to gain control of the channel. In his characteristic manner, he pressured the other side to cooperate. The National Council on Television and Radio, which was under the president’s control, refused to renew the licence for 112 Ukraine, citing its non-transparent ownership structure. Criminal cases were subsequently opened against the channel’s owner.
The pressure proved unsuccessful. The channel’s management alleged political pressure, and both Pidshchypkov and the channel’s creative producer, Viktor Zubrytskyi, left the country.
Around the same time, it emerged that Viktor Polishchuk was supposedly planning to buy the TV channel. According to the widely accepted version of events, he was acting on Poroshenko’s behalf. Polishchuk is a rather colourful businessman, the owner of the Eldorado electronics retail chain and a former owner of the Gulliver shopping centre. His bank, Mykhailivskyi, left thousands of defrauded depositors in its wake and cost the state billions of hryvnias, yet Polishchuk himself avoided these troubles. The secret of his success was widely believed to be his marriage to the niece of the Russian politician Dmitry Medvedev.
It is reliably known that Paseniuk also took part in these negotiations. His involvement was not coincidental, as in 2014 ICU had served as a financial advisor to Mykhailivskyi Bank.
Paseniuk himself stated that Polishchuk had wanted to use his services to buy the channel for himself (for whom else?). However, according to Viktor Zubrytskyi, a top manager at the 112 TV channel, both Polishchuk and Paseniuk were acting on behalf of Poroshenko. I do not know about you, but I am inclined to believe Zubrytskyi.
According to Ekonomichna Pravda, Polishchuk received money from Poroshenko, between $3 million and $5 million, to make a deposit.
In the end, the money was not needed. The second round of negotiations also failed. Paseniuk withdrew from the negotiations concerning the 112 Ukraine TV channel. We do not know exactly why, but there is a compelling story. According to Pidshchypkov, Polishchuk openly threatened him.
All of these are accounts that emerged during Poroshenko’s presidency.
Three years later the channel was acquired by Taras Kozak, an MP from Viktor Medvedchuk’s circle. In December 2018, Kozak bought it through offshore companies, using funds of non-transparent origin. In 2021, the channel was shut down as a result of sanctions imposed by the National Security and Defence Council.
Alternative version explains the time gap
If you look closely, you will notice a gap between these events. It remains unclear what happened in the period between Poroshenko’s negotiations and the eventual sale to Medvedchuk. This gap is both significant and intriguing. Below are some facts that may help to fill it in.
Initially, it was widely believed that ICU was acting on Poroshenko’s behalf. However, another version of events has since emerged. Representatives of Dmytro Firtash reportedly took part in both rounds of negotiations involving Poroshenko. It is possible that Firtash himself acquired the channel from Yanukovych’s associates and later sold it to Medvedchuk.
Overall, the idea of a partnership between Poroshenko and Firtash is not entirely surprising. Rumours persisted after the Euromaidan revolution that the two, along with Vitali Klitschko, had reached a private arrangement.
As for the 112 Ukraine channel, the following facts are particularly noteworthy.
1. What is Channel 112, as a corporation?
The purchase of the channel for the benefit of Poroshenko was indeed being prepared. Perhaps it was really just a matter of money.
Let me remind you that 112 Ukraine is not a single TV channel, but a group. In particular, six of the companies were registered in Cypriot offshore companies that contained “112” in their names:
- Secundiana Media 112 Ltd
- Tertiana Media 112 Ltd
- Quartiana Media 112 Ltd
- Quintiana Media 112 Ltd
- Sextiana Media 112 Ltd
- Septiana Media 112 Ltd
As we recall, since May 2015, Onyshchenko and Paseniuk have been negotiating the purchase of TV channels. In this regard, it is interesting that in July 2015, the above-mentioned offshore companies were transferred from Cypriot citizens to the Seychelles-based company Kouly Ventures. Andrii Pidshchypkov was declared the main beneficiary of this company. Why? I can only speculate: one company is much more convenient when preparing for a sale.
2. Nominee company Maresko Holdings Limited established to acquire 112 TV
Around the same time, in preparation for the acquisition of the channels, ICU established a nominee company, Maresko Holdings Limited (BVI), through its Cypriot law firm partner Dadlaw. Its final beneficiary was… no, not Poroshenko, but Valid Arfush, who held a senior position at Euronews Ukraine, the name of one of the projects of the Inter TV channel.
It is likely that Arfush acted as a nominal owner. He has never had enough capital to buy a TV channel like 112 Ukraine, and since March 2015, he has been running a joint project with a gas oligarch.
Obviously, ICU helped with putting the deal together. On 31 July 2015, when the first negotiations (involving Onyshchenko and Paseniuk) were still ongoing, Project Volcano was born. This is the name of the draft agreement. It was an option (right) to purchase shares. Maresko Holdings Limited (BVI) was issuing the option, and the recipient had yet to be specified (let’s call him X). The option guaranteed that Maresko would sell X shares in the six TV channels with the numbers 112 in their names.
Who was Mr X? There are not many variants/options.
The option would have been exercisable on the sole condition that Maresko Holdings Limited (BVI) itself buys the channels. As you know, the deal fell through, and Maresko did not become the owner of 112 Ukraine. The well-known explanation is that they did not agree on price.
3. ICU Holdings bought Maresko Holdings
In December 2015, ICU Holdings bought Maresko Holdings Limited (BVI) from Arfush. The offshore company was renamed ICU International LTD.
What does this point to? It can be assumed that ICU originally created Maresko and registered it in Arfush’s name in order to buy TV channels with it. And when the deal fell through, the company turned out to be unnecessary, so they bought it out.
I have screenshots of documents showing that the directors of ICU International LTD (formerly Maresko) were Harris Demetriades, Makar Paseniuk and Kostyantyn Stetsenko, all Greeks with hard-to-pronounce surnames. But the company was owned by Dadlaw Nominees Limited (the same law firm with which ICU worked) and ICU Holdings Limited (BVI), an offshore company.
If the documents are genuine (and the likelihood is very high), this transaction points to joint actions by Poroshenko and Firtash with ICU. The first two are already under sanctions, the third is not.
4. The collapse of the deal
It has already been mentioned above that the second negotiations on the purchase of 112 Ukraine were conducted by Viktor Polishchuk and Makar Paseniuk. The negotiations took place at the end of 2015. During the negotiations, Pidshchypkov claimed that Polishchuk threatened him in the presence of Paseniuk. According to him, there was a recording of this moment, but it either did not appear in the public domain or quickly disappeared.
The technical side of things is interesting. On 2 November 2016, ICU acquired two companies registered in the British Virgin Islands: Filigree Holdings Ltd and Startpoint Trading Ltd.
ICU bought the first company from Polischuk and the second from media manager Yegor Benkendorf. It is possible that the channels of 112 Ukraine were to be split between the two buyers.
Benckendorf has been Chairman of the Board of Inter since 2013. Another interesting detail. Startpoint Trading Ltd was mentioned in one of the packages of leaked offshore documents as a company set up to acquire media assets in Ukraine.
As we know, the second attempt to buy 112 Ukraine also failed. This is probably why ICU bought out both offshore companies for its own needs. The buyer was again ICU Holdings Limited.
This “coincidence” once again hints that ICU was dealing with Poroshenko and Firtash, both of whom are currently under sanctions.
5. Yegor Benkendorf and Ivor Omson
On 10 November 2016, Yegor Benkendorf was appointed CEO of the 112 Ukraine TV channel. This happened shortly after he was dismissed from his managerial position at “Inter”.
It is unknown who owned 112 Ukraine at that time. Benkendorf later called himself one of the owners of the channel, without mentioning the others.
According to open sources, in the summer of 2016, the 112 Group channels began to own each other, and Ivor Omson was named as the beneficiary. The real owner was allegedly Pidshchypkov. But let me question this statement.
Omson was most likely a representative of Firtash. In 2016, it was said that they were both directors of the same company, Simia Holdings Limited.
6. Eduard Katz acquires 112, sells it to Taras Kozak
In April 2018, the channel became the property of German citizen Eduard Katz. And in December 2018, Katz sold the channel to Taras Kozak from Medvedchuk’s entourage. The rest you know.
7. ICU all the way
The above facts demonstrate the deep involvement of ICU in the attempts to acquire 112 Ukraine through a complex structure of nominal owners. According to the new data, the company most likely cooperated with Dmytro Firtash through his media managers.
The biggest intrigue was the motivation of Firtash himself. Why did he participate in the deal? Why did he need another TV channel when the oligarch himself had already left Ukraine and settled in Vienna?
His agreements with Poroshenko also remain an intrigue. According to the publicly available version, it was “The Grey-Haired” [Poroshenko’s nickname] himself who wanted to buy 112 Ukraine. Poroshenko is the owner of a billion-dollar fortune, and he could well have afforded this purchase without involving other partners. I can only assume that there was a certain agreement between the two oligarchs.
Of course, neither Poroshenko, Firtash, nor Paseniuk would want to remember those times today. Today, they all have a vested interest in making sure that the details of the negotiations are lost without a trace. But documents aren’t vanished in thin air.
In my opinion, the key to understanding the story is the Investment Capital Ukraine group. They must have been the real insiders in this deal, and perhaps even engineered it. ICU was engaged not only in negotiations but also in the execution of the future deal through offshore companies. Perhaps they would even manage this media outlet for the benefit of the new owners. So I draw a conclusion. If there were agreements between the oligarchs currently under sanctions, ICU and Makar Paseniuk must have known about them.
According to all the laws of the genre, ICU is a legitimate candidate for NSDC sanctions. After all, Firtash, Poroshenko, Yanukovych and Medvedchuk are already sanctioned. It is incredibly lucky to live without sanctions with such a list of clients/partners.
ICU’s longstanding good fortune could well have turned into a sense of impunity. But life is full of surprises. It is worth taking a closer look at the group’s current operations. It is certain that skeletons will come out of the closets of many respected people. It is quite possible that these will even be persons under sanctions.
By Oleg Posternak
